Incidents/2025-01-21 Gerrit unavailable
document status: draft
Summary
| Incident ID | 2025-01-21 Gerrit unavailable | Start | 2025-01-21 12:34:00 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Task | End | 2025-01-21 14:08:00 | |
| People paged | 2 | Responder count | 3 |
| Coordinators | sobanski | Affected metrics/SLOs | No relevant SLOs exist |
| Impact | Gerrit largely inaccessible for all users | ||
Incoming traffic impaired Gerrit and made it inaccessible for all users.
Timeline
Write a step by step outline of what happened to cause the incident, and how it was remedied. Include the lead-up to the incident, and any epilogue.
Consider including a graphs of the error rate or other surrogate.
Link to a specific offset in SAL using the SAL tool at https://sal.toolforge.org/ (example)
All times in UTC.
- 12:34 ProbeDown for Gerrit alerts. OUTAGE BEGINS
- 13:08 Urbanecm manually pages SRE
- 14:07 Gerrit traffic returns to normal OUTAGE ENDS
Detection
Write how the issue was first detected. Was automated monitoring first to detect it? Or a human reporting an error?
Copy the relevant alerts that fired in this section.
Did the appropriate alert(s) fire? Was the alert volume manageable? Did they point to the problem with as much accuracy as possible?
TODO: If human only, an actionable should probably be to "add alerting".
Conclusions
OPTIONAL: General conclusions (bullet points or narrative)
What went well?
- …
OPTIONAL: (Use bullet points) for example: automated monitoring detected the incident, outage was root-caused quickly, etc
What went poorly?
- …
OPTIONAL: (Use bullet points) for example: documentation on the affected service was unhelpful, communication difficulties, etc
Where did we get lucky?
- …
OPTIONAL: (Use bullet points) for example: user's error report was exceptionally detailed, incident occurred when the most people were online to assist, etc
Links to relevant documentation
- …
Add links to information that someone responding to this alert should have (runbook, plus supporting docs). If that documentation does not exist, add an action item to create it.
Actionables
- …
Create a list of action items that will help prevent this from happening again as much as possible. Link to or create a Phabricator task for every step.
Add the #Sustainability (Incident Followup) and the #SRE-OnFire Phabricator tag to these tasks.
Scorecard
| Question | Answer
(yes/no) |
Notes | |
|---|---|---|---|
| People | Were the people responding to this incident sufficiently different than the previous five incidents? | no | |
| Were the people who responded prepared enough to respond effectively | no | ||
| Were fewer than five people paged? | yes | ||
| Were pages routed to the correct sub-team(s)? | no | ||
| Were pages routed to online (business hours) engineers? Answer “no” if engineers were paged after business hours. | yes | ||
| Process | Was the "Incident status" section atop the Google Doc kept up-to-date during the incident? | no | |
| Was a public wikimediastatus.net entry created? | no | ||
| Is there a phabricator task for the incident? | no | ||
| Are the documented action items assigned? | yes | ||
| Is this incident sufficiently different from earlier incidents so as not to be a repeat occurrence? | no | ||
| Tooling | To the best of your knowledge was the open task queue free of any tasks that would have prevented this incident? Answer “no” if there are open tasks that would prevent this incident or make mitigation easier if implemented. | no | |
| Were the people responding able to communicate effectively during the incident with the existing tooling? | yes | ||
| Did existing monitoring notify the initial responders? | no | ||
| Were the engineering tools that were to be used during the incident, available and in service? | no | ||
| Were the steps taken to mitigate guided by an existing runbook? | no | ||
| Total score (count of all “yes” answers above) | 4 | ||